Abstract: Corruption frequently occurs in many aspects of multi-party interaction between private agencies and government employees. Past works studying corruption in a lab context have explicitly included covert or illegal activities in participants’ strategy space or have relied on surveys like the Corruption Perception Index (CPI). This paper studies corruption in ecologically realistic settings in which corruption is not suggested to the players a priori but evolves during repeated interaction. We ran studies involving hundreds of subjects in three countries: China, Israel, and the United States. Subjects interacted using a four-player board game in which three bidders compete to win contracts by submitting bids in repeated auctions, and a single auctioneer determines the winner of each auction. The winning bid was paid to an external “government” entity, and was not distributed among the players. The game logs were analyzed posthoc for cases in which the auctioneer was bribed to choose a bidder who did not submit the highest bid. We found that although China exhibited the highest corruption level of the three countries, there were surprisingly more cases of corruption in the U.S. than in Israel, despite the higher PCI in Israel as compared to the U.S. We also found that bribes in the U.S. were at times excessively high, resulting in bribing players not being able to complete their winning contracts. We were able to predict the occurrence of corruption in the game using machine learning. The significance of this work is in providing a novel paradigm for investigating covert activities in the lab without priming subjects, and it represents a first step in the design of intelligent agents for detecting and reducing corruption activities in such settings.

Citation: Ya’akov Gal, Avi Rosenfeld, Sarit Kraus, Michele Gelfand, Bo An and Jun Lin. A new paradigm for the study of corruption across cultures. International Conference on Social Computing, Behavioral-Cultural Modeling, & Prediction (SBP), Maryland, MD, April 2014.

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This work was presented at HAIDM 2014. The 2014 workshop on Human-Agent Interaction Design and Models was co-organised by SmartSociety.

Abstract: To date, a variety of automated negotiation agents have been created. While each of these agents has been shown to be effective in negotiating with people in specific environments, they lack natural language processing support required to enable real-world types of interactions. In this paper we present NegoChat, the first negotiation agent that successfully addresses this limitation. NegoChat contains several significant research contributions. First, we found that simply modifying existing agents to include an NLP module is insufficient to create these agents. Instead, the agents’ strategies must be modified to address partial agreements and issue-by-issue interactions. Second, we present NegoChat’s negotiation algorithm. This algorithm is based on bounded rationality, and specifically Aspiration Adaptation Theory (AAT). As per AAT, issues are addressed based on people’s typical urgency, or order of importance. If an agreement cannot be reached based on the value the human partner demands, the agent retreats, or downwardly lowers the value of previously agreed upon issues so that a “good enough” agreement can be reached on all issues. This incremental approach is fundamentally different from all other negotiation agents, including the state-of-the-art KBAgent. Finally, we present a rigorous evaluation of NegoChat, showing its effectiveness.

Keywords: Human-Agent Systems, Negotiation, Chat Agent.

Citation: Avi Rosenfeld. NegoChat: A Chat-Based Negotiation Agent.

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